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Health Plan of Nev., Inc. v. Rainbow Medical, LLC, 100 P.3d 172 (Nev. 
2004)1 
CIVIL PROCEDURE –ARBITRATION AWARDS 
Summary 
 This case was an appeal and cross-appeal dealing with Nevada’s Uniform 
Arbitration Act and the scope of judicial review of an arbitration award.   
Disposition/Outcome 
 Although the court determined that the district court erred in remanding the 
arbitration results to the arbitrator for clarification, the arbitrator did not exceed his 
authority or manifestly disregard the law with regard to a statement contained in the 
award.  Thus, the arbitration decision was upheld although it should not have been 
remanded based upon the dictates of NRS  38.237(1).2 
Factual and Procedural History 
 Health Plan of Nevada (“HPN”), a health maintenance organization, contracted 
with Rainbow Medical, LLC (“Rainbow”) on August 1, 1995 to provide pharmaceutical 
products and services to HPN members.  Rainbow was formed by a friend of an HPN 
executive who was relatively inexperienced with regard to the services Rainbow was to 
perform.  As compensation, Rainbow received a captitated, or flat rate, per HPN member 
for services provided as payment for its services. 
 In April or May 1996, HPN claimed to have received several complaints with 
regard to the quality of Rainbow’s services, deficiencies which were subsequently cured.  
Later, HPN and Rainbow disputed Rainbow’s service coverage area and fees.  As a 
result, HPN allegedly told Rainbow that Rainbow would receive a capitation increase for 
additional services it provided.   
 Despite various meetings, the two businesses could not reach a final agreement as 
to their disputes.  In May 1997, Rainbow obtained HPN’s consent to assign its rights and 
duties to another pharmaceutical and service provider, First Class Pharmacy and Regency 
Health Services (“First Class”).  However, the agreement between First Class and 
Rainbow stipulated that Rainbow retained rights to any retroactive capitation rate 
adjustments that might accrue for services performed before the time of transfer.   
                                                
1 By Matt Wagner 
2 Nev. Rev. Stat. 38.237(1)(a)-(c) states in pertinent part that an arbitrator may correct or modify an award 
to address: mathematical miscalculations; mistakes in the description of a person, thing, or property 
referenced in an award; technical deficiencies in the form of an award; a submitted claim not referenced in 
an award; or to clarify an award.  
 In June 1997, Rainbow requested a retroactive capitation adjustment for services 
provided prior to the transfer, but HPN denied the request citing Rainbow’s alleged 
failure to provide a high enough quality of service during its association with HPN.  
Rainbow thereafter initiated binding arbitration proceedings. 
 After twenty-two days of reviewing evidence and evaluating witness testimony, 
the arbitrator concluded that HPN had breached its duties of good faith and fair dealing 
and subsequently awarded Rainbow more than $5 million.  In the award, the arbitrator 
concluded that HPN’s initial decision to contract with Rainbow, which he described as a 
“totally green startup,” was a policy decision that placed a heavy mentoring burden on 
HPN.  That burden, cited the arbitrator, included HPN’s duty to incubate Rainbow, and 
an affirmative duty to help Rainbow “crawl, walk, and run.”  
 Owing to these statements, HPN filed a motion to set aside and vacate the 
arbitration award, claiming that the arbitrator either exceeded his powers or manifestly 
disregarded the law in making the assertions regarding the mentoring burden.     
 The district court determined that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by 
imposing a mentoring burden on HPN, and then remanded the case to the arbitrator and 
asked him to reexamine his findings in light of the determination that HPN had no such 
duty.  The arbitrator declared that the statement was gratuitous and had no bearing on the 
award.  The district court then affirmed the award, thus giving rise to the appeal.   
Discussion 
 In Nevada, the scope of judicial review of an arbitration award is limited.3  The 
party attacking the validity of an arbitration award has the burden of proving, by clear 
and convincing evidence, the legal ground relied upon for the challenge.4  In the instant 
case, HPN challenged the arbitrator’s award on two grounds, one statutory and one based 
in the common law.  Statutorily, HPN asserted that the arbitrator exceeded his powers 
pursuant to Nevada statute by imposing a mentoring burden in the award.5  As to the 
common law, HPN contended that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law.   
HPN also contended that, absent a statutory ground such as mathematical mistake, 
technical deficiencies in the form of an award, or the arbitrator’s not addressing a 
submitted claim in an award, remand was improper.  The court agreed, citing that the 
statement regarding the mentoring burden did not qualify under the statutory reasons for 
remand.  However, that alone is not sufficient to vacate the award. 
                                                
3 See Bohlmann v. Printz, 120 Nev. Ad. Rep. 52, 96 P.3d 1155, 1157 (2004); Colmar, Ltd. v. 
Fremantlemedia N. America, 801 N.E.2d 1017, 1029 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
4 E.D.S. Const. v. North End Health Ctr., 412 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Saville Intern., Inc. 
v. Galanti Group, Inc. 438 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Korein v. Rabin, 287 N.Y.S.2d 975, 981 
(App. Div. 1968).   
5 Nev. Rev. Stat. 38.241(1)(d)(2004).   
 The court examined the claim that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by stating 
that absent a showing of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the courts will 
assume that the arbitrator acted within the scope of his power.   
 Arbitrators exceed their power when they address issues or make awards outside 
the scope of the governing contract.6  However, arbitrators do not exceed their power if 
their interpretation of an agreement is rationally grounded in the agreement.  The 
arbitrator’s mentoring statement under the circumstances of the subject case failed to go 
beyond the scope of the agreement.  In fact, to the court, the arbitrator’s statement was 
indicative of his understanding of the contract itself as well as an understanding as to the 
relationship between the two parties.  With that knowledge, the arbitrator was able to 
determine that HPN had not been acting in good faith when it denied Rainbow’s 
capitation rate increase based upon inadequate performance during the course of their 
inter-dealings.   
 Regarding the discussion of the mentoring burden as evidence of the arbitrator’s 
manifest disregard for the law, the court held that the arbitrator never stated that the law 
imposed a mentoring burden on HPN as a result of its contract with Rainbow.  Instead, 
like with the statutory analysis, the arbitrator was simply analyzing the relationship 
between the two parties in order to determine whether the denial of the capitation rate 
increase based upon Rainbow’s performance was reasonable.   
Conclusion 
 Although the court recognized that the district court improperly remanded the 
case to the arbitrator for clarification, the arbitrator in no way exceeded the scope of his 
authority, neither did the arbitrator manifestly disregard the law.  Instead, his statements 
regarding a mentoring burden were conducive to his conclusion that HPN was denying 
Rainbow’s capitation rate increase in bad faith.    
 
                                                
6 Signal Corp. v. Keane Fed. Systems, 574 S.E.2d 253, 257 (Va. 2003).   
